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Cooperation is usually stronger towards in-group members, because giving an up-
right signal about themselves implies higher possibilities of reciprocity among members
with the same social identity. We examine the case where collaboration between two
groups is a mandatory condition to achieve success in a particular project, but in the
ﬁrst one, the social identity is quite strong. We show that the existence of a small share
of prosocial players in the ﬁrst group can create a sort of "imitation eﬀect" so that each
new member puts more eﬀort in cooperating with the outsiders. On the other side,
to avoid free-riding eﬀort should be conditional to the other's commitment. This way
to boost cooperation is usually more eﬃcient than a coercive strategy in the presence
of signiﬁcant sized majorities or feelings of resentments. Our analysis suggests that
it is appropriate, under some circumstances, to stimulate a multicultural paradigm
devoted to value and manage diversity through an acculturation process emphasizing
adaptation, interdependence, and mutual appreciation of diﬀerent cultures.




It is commonly believed that people act more prosocially towards members of their group
than with those outside. There is a broad range of interdisciplinary literature (Everett et al.
2015 and bibliography therein cited), interested in explaining such in-group bias. Everett et
al.(2015) explore in particular to what extent this behavior is driven by preferences for the
welfare of the one own's group or from the beliefs of future reciprocal action by their own,
as well as the outside group.
In this context, a key concept is that of social identity (Taifel, 1974), according to which
a social group is deﬁned as the collection of individuals who perceive to be a member of the
same category sharing common objective or subjective criteria (nationality, gender, jobs,
etc.). Bidirectional actions deﬁne the social identity, i.e. cooperation, which implies the
payment of a cost regarding the eﬀorts devoted to realizing a common outcome which will
beneﬁt all members, namely themselves and the other group members (Dovidio et al., 2006).
The whole outcome of this cooperation is strongly related to the agents' eﬀort and there-
fore to the potential team members showing to work synergistically (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972). The individual beneﬁts, instead, can be perceived as immediate or related to repu-
tational concerns. In the literature on the reputation-based cooperation (see Everett et al.
2015, as well as their bibliography), the most relevant input to push cooperative actions are
the beliefs that the others will reciprocate now or later. In this context, it is important to
give a signal to be perceived as a trustworthy person.
Milinski et al. (2002) show that with the goal of building a good reputation people
cooperate more when they have to contribute to the public good formation, and the Tragedy
of Commons never applies. This cooperation is usually stronger towards in-group members,
as giving a good signal about themselves implies higher possibilities to be reciprocated from
those who share the same social identity (Everett et al.,2015).
Apparently this in-group bias can generate negative externalities for the outside group
as the preferential in group treatments are usually done at the expenses of the outsiders,
also concerning reduced cooperation. According to Sheremeta (2015), in order to succeed
people tend to cooperate more with the others in the same group but, as the eﬀort is not
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costless, they may tend to freeride with the members of the same group and become more
competitive towards the outside groups. The author argues that the main factors aﬀecting
these results are related to group size, sharing rule, interactions context and social impact
function, heterogeneity of players. As pointed out by Everett et al. (2015), it is unclear
whether the cause of this ingroup bias is to be found in preferences related the welfare of
ingroup members or in beliefs about the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members.
In this work, by analyzing cooperation between and within groups, we focus on the issue
of reputational concerns and indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund,
1998, 2005). Naturally, indirect reciprocity happens when individuals decide to make coop-
erative and helpful actions towards others in a strategic way to build up a positive personal
reputation because they will need help, at some point, from the others. As Nietzsche will
put it, it is the selﬁshness of the generous.
Harris et al. (2015) show that when ingroup bias is dangerous towards the outsiders,
some mechanisms of punishment are necessary to set up and share broader ethical social
norms across groups. Nevertheless other authors, by incorporating social preferences into the
economic approach, show that some individuals do help others even when their help is not in
their interest (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). In other words, other-regarding preferences do drive
individuals (at least some of them) in their choices towards the well-being of others, as well
as fairness and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Camerer,
2003). In this work, we try to enlighten some additional insights about reputation-based
in-group favoritism. We investigate through a dynamical model the eﬀect of a share of in-
group members with a pro-social attitude towards the outsiders. In particular, we analyze
a situation where two groups in society must cooperate to realize a joint project, which
needs the eﬀort of both groups to be completed successfully in a given period. Some typical
examples of this situation are the cooperation among sectors in the same organization,
departments of a University, ethnic majorities and minorities (e.g. migrants) living in the
same country, and so on.
As the returns can be diﬀerent from the two groups, taking too much care just to the
in-group reputation may be counterproductive, leading to low eﬀorts to cooperate with the
outside group. This "narrow rep thinking" will result in a less cohesive social aggregation,
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preventing the realization of a multicultural social paradigm. Nevertheless, according to
the literature on other-regarding preferences, when there exists at least a minimal share of
in-group members, reputational concerns can be driven in the direction of a more frequent
cooperation with external groups.
The paper is divided into ﬁve Sections, including Introduction and Conclusions. In
Section 2 we introduce the basic features of our dynamical model and discusses the primary
variables aﬀecting between and within group cooperation. In part 3 we explore how the
existence of this minimal share can boost speciﬁc between-group eﬀorts for the realization
of a joint project. We ﬁnd that two eﬀects are at work: it can either boost betweengroup
cooperation and outsiders free-riding. This suggests a more cautious altruism requiring a
threshold for the eﬀort from the outsiders to activate this minimal share of altruistic people.
In Section 4 we also compare this eﬀect with the case of coercive cooperation by applying a
penalty on the returns of the less cooperative agent in the ﬁrst group. We ﬁnd that this way
to boost cooperation is usually ineﬃcient in the presence of the signiﬁcant sized majorities
or feelings of resentments. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two groups of n1 and n2 individuals, who are engaged in a common project
which needs the joint eﬀorts of both groups to be completed in a given period of time T .
Each group is characterized by his social identity, which is stronger in the ﬁrst one so that
we may assume that only the ﬁrst group utility depends on reputational concerns.
We assume that two new individuals entering in the project must decide how much eﬀort
put in the in-group or betweengroups cooperation, as the full return from the project for
each new agent can be measured as the sum of shares of the single additional returns r1 and
r2, due to their marginal contribution, related to withingroups cooperation. The action of
making an eﬀort has clearly a cost, which we assume to be constant over time, denoted by
a1 and a2 for a representative agent in the ﬁrst and in the second group, respectively. We
also assume in time that u1 and u2 are the maximum exogenous level of eﬀort for the agent
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in each group.
According to these assumptions we solve a dynamical game between the agents in the





e−ρt[r1n1u1(t)u2(t)− α1u21(t)− α2u22(t) + n1R(t)+
r2n2(u1 − u1(t))(u2 − u2(t))− α1(u1 − u1(t))2 − α2(u2 − u2(t))2]dt, (1)
where the control u1 takes values in [0, u1] ∈ R, u2 in [0, u2] ∈ R and the state R is ruled byR
′(t) = −δR(t) + cu1(t)− ku2(t)
R(0) = R0 > 0.
(2)
In the above equation c and k are positive constants, while δ is the depreciation rate.
This last measures the individual's needs for distinctiveness and diﬀerentiation from others
(For instance, according to Brewer, 1991, individuals also avoid self-construals that are
either too personalized or too inclusive and instead deﬁne themselves in terms of distinctive
category memberships) and also the needs to be awarded for their own skills and original
contribution w.r.t. the project, or to avoid alienation, etc.
The term ku2 measures the disruption eﬀect on the Social identity of the ﬁrst group. In
other words, we assume that a social identity is disrupted when the other group is highly
cooperative, so that integration and reciprocity towards it is higher and there is the threat
of rejection for those in the majority who on turn do not reciprocate with the outsider. This
is a sort of bridging (or inclusive) social capital(Putnam, 2000) that, unlike the bonding
social capital which may be more inward looking and have a tendency to reinforce exclusive
identities and homogeneous groups, instead it may be more outward-looking and encompass
people across diﬀerent social divides.





e−ρt[r1n1u1(t)u2(t)− α1u21(t)− α2u22(t)− n1R(t)+
r2n2(u1 − u1(t))(u2 − u2(t))− α1(u1 − u1(t))2 − α2(u2 − u2(t))2]dt, (3)
where again the state R is ruled by (2).
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We remark that for the second agent we subtract n1R since it represents an opportunity
cost that is not necessary for the project itself.
We consider the Hamiltonian function, given u2 associated to (1)(2)
H(t, u1, R, λ) = r1n1u1u2 − α1u21 − α2u22 + n1R+
r2n2(u1 − u1)(u2 − u2)− α1(u1 − u1)2 − α2(u2 − u2)2 + λ(−δR+ cu1 − ku2).
Maximizing the Hamiltonian function with respect to u1 we obtain that it is maximized at
u∗1 given by














Therefore, the optimal level of the eﬀort for the ﬁrst group to cooperate with their own
members mainly depends:
• Positively on the owngroup size (and negatively on the outsidegroup size). In the
literature, the exact eﬀect of group size is controversial enough. According to some the-
oretical predictions, large numbers facilitate free-riding behaviors among their mem-
bers. In this case, the enhancement of cooperation with outsiders and the reduction of
reputation concerns could be more probable. On the contrary, other experimental re-
sults show that for large sized majorities the social identity is stronger and cooperation
within group higher, while it is nearly impossible to be well integrated for minorities
(see Sheremeta 2015 for a survey on both theoretical and empirical analyses). Our
theoretical result shows a positive eﬀect of the group size which strongly depends on
the relevance of reputation concerns if returns from the ﬁrst group are consistent.
• Positively on the eﬀort of the other group proportionally to their full returns. This
means that the more is Group 2 cooperative with Group 1, the higher is the incentive of
the latter to reciprocate and produce within this group while the cooperation with the
outside group lessens. We can hence see how the outsiders are considered as a support
to the improvement of the "small closed society" rather than a possible partner to
cooperate.
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• As the maximum possible eﬀort of the second group increases, the optimal u1 de-
creases, because when it is high enough the ﬁrst group can freeride when cooperating
with the second one, also when returns r2 are large enough.
• Positively on the reputational concerns c through the shadow price λ.
The co-state λ solves:
λ′(t) = ρλ(t)− ∂H
∂R
= (ρ+ δ)λ(t)− n1, (6)
together with the transversality condition
λ(T ) = 0. (7)




[1− e(ρ+δ)(t−T )]. (8)
As far as the second agent is concerned, substituting (4) in (3) we maximize with respect
to u2 the Hamiltonian function
H(t, u2, R, µ) = r1n1u
∗
1u2 − α1u∗12 − α2u22 − n1R+
r2n2(u1 − u∗1)(u2 − u2)− α1(u1 − u∗1)2 − α2(u2 − u2)2 + µ(−δR+ cu∗1 − ku2).
Hence we get the F.O.C.
∂H
∂u2
= [2(r1n1 + r2n2)C2 − 4α1C22 − 4α2]u2+
(2α2 − r2n2)u2 + (2α1C2 − r2n2)u1 + +cC2µ = 0,
the co-state µ solves
µ′(t) = ρµ(t)− ∂H
∂R
= (ρ+ δ)µ(t) + n1, (9)
and satisﬁes the transversality condition
µ(T ) = 0. (10)




[e(ρ+δ)(t−T ) − 1]. (11)
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Notice that µ = −λ as expected, having the ﬁrst group reputational concerns R opposite
eﬀects on the two similar players in diverse group. In fact, it represents a cost for the second
group and a beneﬁt for the ﬁrst one.





2 − α2)u2 + (2α2 − r2n2C2)u2 + (2α1C2 − r2n2)u1 + (cC2 − k)µ = 0,
In order to maximize H we assume C22 <
α2
α1
(which implies that the costs of eﬀort to
cooperate with the ﬁrst group are higher enough w.r.t the returns to still make convenient
cooperate with the one own's group, otherwise the player 2 would put the maximum eﬀort
only in the ﬁrst one) and we derive that the maximum is attained at u∗2 deﬁned as
u∗2(t) =
(2α2 − r2n2C2)u2 + (2α1C2 − r2n2)u1 + (cC2 − k)µ(t)
4(α2 − α1C22 )
(12)
• Notice that for the representative agent in the second group, for high values of n2r2,
the highest costs of eﬀort may reduce the amount of it that the player wants to provide.
In general, these costs can be very high for minorities due to extrinsic factors (for in-
stance diverse infrastructure for people in diﬀerent countries, diﬀerence in language for
minorities ethnical groups, etc.). Removing these unfair costs, through a multicultural
paradigm promoting more integration, could be convenient for the organization when
better minority performance can recover them and realize a more common proﬁtable
project.
• Moreover, for higher values of r2 (e the group size n2) the outsider may freeride w.r.t
his own group and contribute more with the other one.
• On the other side, the disruption eﬀect k is negative because it needs less eﬀort to
have great inﬂuence on the behaviour of the ﬁrst group and weaken his social identity,
so that the outsider can cooperate more with his own group.
• Finallly, as expected, the positive eﬀect of c on the optimal level of the eﬀorts, concerns
both the ﬁrst and the second group and this last through the shadow price µ. For
high values of r1 and n1, people in the minority group must contribute with higher
eﬀorts with the ﬁrst group to be integrated but u2 increases also because that group
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is working hard only with their peers and cooperation with them become the main
way to realize the project, instead of working with their own group.
3 Cooperation among groups may be boosted by small
shares of individuals with pro-social attitudes towards
the outsiders.
As the possible maximum eﬀort of the second group increases, the optimal u1 decreases,
because when it is high enough the ﬁrst group can freeride when cooperating with the
second one, even if returns r2 are large enough.
Cooperation among groups may be boosted by small shares of individuals with pro-social
attitudes towards the outsiders.
Our results found in the previous Section show that also when the second group is
highly productive, and it could be eﬃcient to cooperate more with it, this cooperation may
be sharply limited because of the ﬁrst group reputational concerns c. If we imagine a more
cohesive society, with a hypothetical social planner who sets up the levels of the eﬀorts that
both the agents should provide to realize a shared proﬁtable project, it will solve a simple
intertemporal maximization problem without any small hint of motion on R. In this way,
the optimal values of u1 and u2 would depend only on the returns, costs and size of both
groups(more details on these results are available upon request).
According to some authors (see for instance Sheremeta, 2015 and bibliography therein
cited) when this is the case, a mechanism of punishment could enforce cooperation between
groups. In this paper we want to explore another less coercive solution to build a more
cohesive society where the only relevant concerns are about the project realization by each
member. In particular, we aim to investigate a case where cooperation among groups can
be pushed up by small shares of individuals with pro-social attitudes towards the outsiders.
Speciﬁcally, in this Section, we analyze how the dissemination of good practices between
groups by a small proportion of individuals with other-regarding preferences can boost
cooperation through a kind of "imitation eﬀect". Such a result may arise since it pushes
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collaboration with diﬀerent types of stakeholders (Becchetti, 2007). This promotion towards
hybrid collaboration can happen at the corporate level, i.e. the so-called "social market en-
terprises" like fair traders(Becchetti, 2007); but also at a social level when migration policies
or social incentives are put in place to smooth social conﬂicts and push individuals towards
integration. Similarly, in our case we can see how this share of individuals with other-
regarding preferences can limit the reputational concerns, hence encouraging collaboration
with outsiders.
Under these assumptions, in this revised version of the model the two players solve the
same maximization problems as in the previous Section but where R is now ruled by:R
′(t) = −δR(t) + cu1(t)− ku2(t) + s(u1 − u1(t))
R(0) = R0 > 0.
(13)
where s is a positive constant measuring the share or the sensitivity of the ﬁrst group
members to the cooperation with the outsiders(between group reciprocity).
Proceeding as in the previous Section, we ﬁnd:
u∗∗1 (t) = C1 + C2u2(t) + C3λ(t) (14)
where the costate variable λ is the given by (8), the constants C1, C2 are deﬁned in (5) and




= C3 − s
4α1
Therefore it is:






Similarly, for the second player, we get:
u∗∗2 (t) =
(2α2 − r2n2C2)u2 + (2α1C2 − r2n2)u1 + [(c− s)C2 − k]µ(t)
4(α2 − α1C22 )
, (16)
where the costate µ is deﬁned in (11).
1. The share s of altruistic agents in the group boosts cooperation towards the outsiders:
as expected, it reduces the optimal value of u1 through a decrease in the reputational
concerns by an amount c − s, and consequently it increases the optimal eﬀort to
contribute with the outside group.
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2. The share s of altruistic agents may also boost outsiders' free-riding.The eﬀect of a
reduced u1 is controversial as it depends also on the reaction of the other agent,
that is on the new optimal level of the endogenous variable u2. This depends on the
existence of free-riding towards the ﬁrst group. In other words, the eﬀect of the share
s on the optimal value of u2 is not unambiguous: this value decreases as c− s raises.
Therefore the ousider representative agent contributes less in the ﬁrst group, as the
eﬀect of reputational concerns and social identity is weaker and he can free-ride from
the others' augmented cooperation-integration (in this context by free-riding we mean
that the outsider becomes more competitive in the ﬁrst group and more cooperative
with his own group). This eﬀect is lower for low values of the disruption variable k.
The issue of the free riding problem inside a group has been broadly analyzed in Olson's
work (1965), who claims that free riding in a group is more likely to happen if a group
endeavors collective action to provide public goods. On the contrary, individuals will not
freeride against the eﬀorts of the others, if the group will procure beneﬁts to active members.
Indeed, when freeriding happens, collective action is impossible, even if there are common
interests and dependance among group members. Olson identiﬁed incentives like selective
rewards and coercive participation as the only ways to solve out the free-riding problem.
In this Section instead, we show that there exists the possibility to have a freeriding
issue between groups. In fact, we see that the share of altruistic people in the ﬁrst group
may boost free-riding behavior from the outsiders towards the ﬁrst group itself. Our results
show that the full eﬀect depends on two combined forces acting in the same direction, i.e.
increased cooperation from the ﬁrst group versus the outsiders can count either on the
"imitation eﬀect" of the generous people or the increased free-riding from the second one.
The ﬁrst eﬀect prevails for very low values of k, holding other things constant.
Otherwise, it seems suitable, in such context, to follow Olson's proposal (1965) to be
altruistic only with the outsider who will in turn procure beneﬁts to the active members.
In our model this implies to add an activation constraint such that the law of motion of R
becomes
R′(t) = −δR(t) + cu1(t)− ku2(t) + s(u1 − u1(t))
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where s > 0 iff u2 ≥ u˜20 otherwise (17)
The ﬁrst group sets the value of u˜2 considering the possibility and necessary contribution
to request from the outsiders to be integrated in the ﬁrst group and to realize the return r1
from the common project (for instance it could be u˜2 = u
∗
2).
4 Coercive vs altruistic cooperation towards the out-
siders
In this Section, we consider that diﬀerent solutions have been proposed to solve out the
problem of free riding. In Olson's work (1965) even coercive participation may be a way
to remediate to the free-riding problem. Therefore, we wonder if a similar solution can be
applied to enhance cooperation from the ﬁrst group towards the second one.
The usual two diﬀerent approaches are the coercive and cooperative enforcement strate-
gies. In general, human societies are constituted by a set of collaborative and coercive
orders that coexist, sometimes in a harmonic way, other times they conﬂict. For example,
social and institutional innovations that allow individuals to improve their living conditions
often develop without the need of coercive power to impose the respect of particular rules.
Individuals are aware of the beneﬁts and spontaneously accept them. On the contrary,
sometimes a cooperative society cannot exist without a coercive power able to impose some
new rules. Furthermore sometimes the intervention of coercive power is necessary to re-
move barriers to new joint and social stability cooperation (Montani,2008). Functionally,
punishment, also referred to as negative reciprocity, coercion, etc., is likely to be essential
for maintaining cooperation. Third-party punishment, where the costs are borne by the
individual but the beneﬁts accrue to the group, has received recent theoretical interest and
has been suggested to be essential to human cooperation (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2003;
Fehr and Gachter 2000; Bowles and Gintis 2003; Boyd et al. 2003). This eﬀective punish-
ment can be a fundamental pivot of non-kin cooperation when considering an occurrance
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that belongs only to human beings. On one hand, positive sentiments - empathy, generosity
and so on can lead individuals to prosocial actions towards strangers; on the other, negative
feelings, like spite and sensitivity to unfairness, can play a pivotal role too. In fact, they can
push individuals to punishment against free-riders (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Boyd
et al. 2005; Tomasello et al. 2005; Hill et al. 2009).
Nevertheless, there is also evidence in the literature showing that commitment to abid-
ance can make sanctions counter-productive, spreading bitter feelings among regulated fa-
cilities with the consequent unwillingness to cooperate with regulators in the future (Burby
and Paterson, 1993). In many contexts, a coercive response to these events may breed
strong resentments. Burby and Paterson (1993) study the best strategy to increase com-
pliance either with the performance standard or with speciﬁcation standard. According to
their ﬁndings, a cooperative approach produces a higher impact regarding the compliance
with the performance standard. In several cases it is possible to create a collaborative order
without coercion but through sequential iterative processes (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981)
which lead to the manifestation of planned and desired cooperative behavior. Also, we can
hypothesize situations, described by the prisoner's dilemma, some cases where individuals
can change from noncooperation to cooperation by looking at the advantages from the re-
ciprocal cooperation and reach an agreement. Conversely, Batson (1991) ﬁnds prosocial
feelings, e.g. empathy, a fundamental driver of prosocial actions towards newcomers.
To take into account these considerations, we propose a slightly revised version of the
model, where a penalty φu1 is applied on the total return going to the subject of group one,
proportional to the eﬀort he puts into his group, and that according to a hypothetical Social





e−ρt[r1n1u1(t)u2(t)− α1u21(t)− α2u22(t) + n1R(t)+
r2n2(u1 − u1(t))(u2 − u2(t))− α1(u1 − u1(t))2 − α2(u2 − u2(t))2 − φu1]dt, (18)
where φ is a positive constant and the state R is ruled by (2).
Solving the above maximization problem and assuming that u2 is given and ﬁxed at the
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Therefore, exploiting (14), we derive that uˇ1(t) > u
∗∗









[1− e(ρ+δ)(t−T )]. (20)
The above inequality, for huge sized majority groups, i.e. for n1 big enough, always holds
true. Hence, in this case, it is satisﬁed also for very small values of s.
Finally, notice that to take into account also the possibility of resentment, making co-
ercion counterproductive, i.e. the penalty generates aversion towards the outsiders who are
indirectly responsible for that, in our model this would imply that k decreases proportionally.
That is the case where a coercive approach may even be counterproductive by engendering
intransigence the low of motion of R becomes R′(t) = −δR(t) + cu1(t) − k(1 − υφ)u2(t)
which, by raising the optimal value of u∗2, will clearly reduce the optimal amount of u1 the
ﬁrst player would provide to the outsiders.
5 Conclusions
In an increasingly globalized and multicultural society, the promotion of diversity seems a
necessary prerequisite when the goal is to create a joint project that requires the eﬀort of
diﬀerent groups.
Using a dynamical analysis, we show that several factors should be taken into consider-
ation to boost cooperation between groups when reputational concerns and social identity
play an important role for the majority group. In particular, when minorities have low per-
formance and desire to integrate and high propensity to free riding, then it could be more
eﬃcient to choose a low-inclusive model which could also be more eﬀective if the fulﬁllment
of the group is very high. Nevertheless, it is more common to encounter the case where
cohesion among group members is pivotal for high performance at work while drifting to a
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group think mechanism (Whyte, 1952) can be dangerous. In particular, when the minority
has better performance, it would be better to enhance outside group cooperation. Some
organizations operate more eﬃciently with a homogeneous workforce while others are more
eﬃcient with a heterogeneous workforce.
Our results suggest that when this is the case strategies for managing multicultural
organizations, and a new social multicultural paradigm are necessary. In particular, we
show that the existence of a tiny share of prosocial players in the ﬁrst group can create a
sort of "imitation eﬀect" such that each new individual in the group gives less emphasis to
personal reputation inside the group and puts more eﬀort in cooperating with the outsiders.
On the other side, to avoid free-riding eﬀort should be conditional to the other's commitment.
We also show that this way to boost cooperation is more eﬃcient than a coercive strategy
in the presence of the signiﬁcant sized majorities or feelings of resentments. Therefore,
according to our analysis, it could be appropriate, under some circumstances to stimulate a
multicultural paradigm so as to increase the share of prosocial people in the majority group.
There is substantial literature debating diverse groups and organizations performance
advantages and disadvantages (see White, 1999). For instance, this usually happens when
multicultural organizations: i)attract the highest quality of human resources, uphold and
further the highest percentage of workers from diverse cultural backgrounds; ii) can under-
stand and penetrate wider and enhanced (foreign) markets; iii) display greater creativity
and innovation and a better problem-solving ability; iv) are better able to adapt to change
and exhibit more organizational ﬂexibility). Apparently, despite the compelling advantages
possessed by the multicultural organizations, when diversity is not managed in an eﬃcient
manner, it can result in dysfunctional outcomes. Inadequate communication, weak team
spirit, long decision timing and less team cohesion are more likely to arise in such cases. This
mechanism has the higher probability to happen when the social identity of the ﬁrst group is
unyielding. Therefore cross-cultural training is necessary to enable culturally diverse groups
to live up to their potential and overcome communication diﬃculties. Therefore, managers
in an organization or social planners in society should reconcile ambitious objectives, sustain
the identity of minority group members, scatter power in a representative way. Addition-
ally, they should take actions when having abundant resources, and cultural diversities are
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understood. Furthermore, in a society where diverse groups coincide there is the need for
strategies and programs to value and manage diversity through an acculturation process that
emphasizes two-way learning, adaptation, interdependence, and mutual appreciation of dif-
ferent cultures. Also, an eﬃcient communication needs to exchange new ideas, grievances,
input and feedback. Before new paradigms can be created, however, the cultural environ-
ment has to experience greater acceptance, especially for evaluating in a positive way the
inevitable change, as well as the challenge of an increasingly diverse society.
17
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